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LOCK THEM UP AND THROW AWAY
THE KEY: HOW WASHINGTON'S
VIOLENT SEXUAL PREDATOR LAW
WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE BALANCE
BETWEEN PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION
Sarah E. Spierling*
INTRODUCTION
It was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that
practitioners in the field of mental health law rejected the draconian
approach to the institutionalization of the mentally disabled and
initiated a movement to "establish and protect" the rights of those
with psychiatric and developmental disabilities as "a means of
gaining fair and equal treatment and fostering the respect and
dignity every human being deserves."' Two United States Supreme
Court decisions in particular provide the bookends for the sea
change in the attitudes of the public with respect to the rights of
the mentally ill: Buck v. Bell 2 in 1927, and City of Cleburne v.
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.S., Boston University 1996. The
author wishes to thank her family, and Kevin and Carey, for their enthusiastic
support.
ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 1 (1996). Proponents of involuntary civil commit-
ment believe that "[b]y providing essential treatment, commitment restores
decisional capacity and individual liberty. After treatment is completed, most
patients.., will be thankful that they were committed." Id. at 25. Furthermore,
proponents believe that involuntary commitment will offer some safety to those
who would not otherwise survive outside an institution. Id. at 25-26.
2 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The issue in Buck was whether the State of Virginia
could perform involuntary sterilizations on people with mental retardation to
prevent them from having children who may also be born retarded. The Supreme
Court held that it could. Id. at 207.
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Cleburne Living Center3 in 1985.' Between Buck and Cleburne,
judicial recognition of the rights of people with mental disabilities
advanced significantly, and courts eventually concluded that the
mentally disabled, "like others, have and retain their substantive
constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by
the law.",5
Despite the recognition that the mentally ill have due process
rights, the development of involuntary civil commitment has
operated as a severe check on such rights. Involuntary civil
commitment emerged to address a multitude of concerns about
people with mental disabilities who were themselves unable to
recognize or respond appropriately to their illnesses.6 Involuntary
civil commitment statutes exist in every state,7 and allow the state
to commit a person against his or her will if there is proof of a
mental disability that poses a substantial threat of serious harm to
oneself or others.8 The threat of harm must be real and present,
and the burden of proof to establish dangerousness (to self or
' 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Court held that mental retardation was a
characteristic that must be taken into account by the government when making
laws, and that legislation that distinguished between the mentally retarded and
others, must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at
446.
4 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
6 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 24. "Many proponents of
[involuntary] commitment insist that confinement should be based on a simple
need for treatment ... [and] help those with diminished mental capacity who are
unable to seek the treatment they desperately need." LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 24.
' See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-27.13 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (West 2000); see also
Sandy Lovell, Court Lifts Three-Month Ban on Megan's Law Notifications, N.J.
L.J. 193, July 17, 2000, at 161. After the enactment of Megan's Law, every
state has some type of sexual predator notification statute. Id. States that have
specific commitment statutes include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 397 (1997).
8 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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others) must be clear and convincing. 9 Proponents of involuntary
commitment viewed this form of treatment as a last resort effort to
help the mentally disabled who were imminently dangerous and in
desperate need of mental health treatment,1" while critics of the
practice focused on the fact that there is no assurance that such
commitment accomplishes the goal of treatment and improvement
of mental condition.1" Despite ardent opposition by opponents,
these statutes have withstood numerous constitutional challenges.
12
Legislators have traditionally codified treatment by civil
commitment within a state's civil code as opposed to its criminal
code, because the idea behind civil commitment is not to punish a
person for a wrongdoing, but rather to treat a person to make him
or her a healthy member of society. Despite the loss of liberty,
courts have upheld such commitments as civil in nature because of
the treatment purpose behind the statutes. Within the past decade,
states have taken this idea of treatment by civil commitment even
further, by tying it to criminal sentences for sex offenders.' 3 In
1990, Washington became the first state to implement such a
statute," including a controversial provision for the involuntary
commitment of sex offenders to the Special Commitment Center("SCC") housed at McNeil Island, which is also home to the
9 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27.
10 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 24-25.
1 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22-23.
12 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (allowing clinical
predictions of dangerous, even if inaccurate, to justify involuntary confinement);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (rejecting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard at commitment hearings); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975) (the first Supreme Court case to review the constitutional boundaries of
civil commitment).
13 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a01. Kansas' statute is modeled after Washington's 1990 Community
Protection Act and has survived challenges to several constitutional provisions,
including the Due Process, double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses, in Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2000).
14 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09. This statute is known as the 1990
Community Protection Act.
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McNeil Island Corrections Center.'5 Created under the 1990
Community Protection Act, 6 the SCC houses violent sex offend-
ers deemed too dangerous to be released after serving their criminal
sentences.' 7 At the SCC, the state has created a hospital-type
setting, where residents take classes on anger and stress manage-
ment, while undergoing therapy designed to help them control their
violent impulses.' 8 Since the passage of this law, however, the
SCC has been severely attacked. Critics argue that its treatment
"5 See Dep't of Corrections, Institutional Operations, available at http://-
www.wa.gov/doc/Content/oco.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2001). McNeil Island is
classified as one of Washington's "major institutions," and primarily houses
maximum, close and medium custody offenders. It is located in Steilacom, Wash.
Id.
16 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.
'7 Id. at § 71.09.030. The statute reads:
When it appears that: (1) A person who at any time previously has
been convicted of a sexually violent offense is about to be released
from total confinement on, before, or after July 1, 1990; (2) a person
found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile is
about to be released from total confinement on, before, or after July 1,
1990; (3) a person who has been charged with a sexually violent
offense and who has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial
is about to be released, or has been released on, before, or after July
1, 1990, pursuant to RCW 10.77.090(3); (4) a person who has been
found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense is
about to be released, or has been released on, before, or after July 1,
1990, pursuant to RCW 10.77.020(3), 10.77.110 (1) or (3),or 10.77.-
150; or (5) a person who at any time previously has been convicted of
a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total
confinement and has committed a recent overt act; and it appears that
the person may be a sexually violent predator, the prosecuting attorney
of the county where the person was convicted or charged or the
attorney general if requested by the prosecuting attorney may file a
petition alleging that the person is a "sexually violent predator" and
stating sufficient facts to support such allegation.
Id.
1" Keiko Morris, Sex Offender's Plea for Freedom: Rapist Says He's
'Gained A Lot' from Treatment, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at B1. While
the SCC has not specified what treatment is most effective, the center's clinical
director, Vincent Gollogly, pointed out in a May report that risk of re-offending
diminishes with treatment. Id.
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program and facilities are punitive in nature, thereby violating the
Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution, and demand the release of those offenders committed
under the statute's provisions.1 9 The statute survived the most
recent constitutional attack in Seling v. Young. 20 This decisive
opinion is critically important to opponents of civil commitment,
sex offenders and states because this is likely to be the last time
the Supreme Court will accept review of this issue.
None of the sex offender laws with involuntary civil commit-
ment provisions have been held to violate the constitution by the
United States Supreme Court.21 It is possible, however, that the
Court's analysis was not correct. Traditional civil commitment
statutes have been deemed constitutional because they provide the
means for people with mental disabilities to return to society once
successfully treated, in addition to providing for the treatment
necessary to attain a socially acceptable level of competence. 22
But current sex offender statutes have been held constitutional even
if they do not meet the treatment element.23 In fact, the Young
decision severely limits the remedies available to the mentally
disabled, 24 holding Washington State's statute constitutional,
'9 See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 529
U.S. 1017 (2000) (holding that the statute is not punitive in nature and is
therefore constitutional); In re Turay, 986 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1999) (finding that
commitment as sexually violent predator is constitutional); In re Campbell, 986
P.2d 771 (Wash. 1999) (holding that while some provisions of the statute are
unconstitutional, the statute itself is constitutional in its application).
20 Seling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727 (2001). For a further discussion of the
history of Young's case, see infra at Part II. B.
21 See, e.g., Young, 121 S. Ct. at 737; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
371 (1997).
22 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66.
23 See Young, 121 S. Ct. at 734. "For those individuals with untreatable
conditions.., there [is] no federal constitutional bar to their civil confinement."
Id.
241 Id. at 735. In Young, the Court dismisses Young's allegations of
inadequate mental health treatment by inferring that these allegations no longer
apply to the assessment of the statutory scheme once the statute has been deemed
civil in nature. Id. at 735. The Court explained:
[Wie do not deny that some of respondent's allegations are serious.
Nor do we express any view as to how [Young's] allegations would
883
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
despite the fact that its treatment provisions do not pass constitu-
tional muster as applied to currently committed offenders. The
Court has now paved the way for states to use civil commitment
as a tool for extending criminal sentencing, taking involuntary
commitment out of the civil context with its accompanying goal of
treatment of mental disabilities, and placing it in the possession of
criminal prosecutors as a means of indefinite punishment. This does
not comport, however, with the policy reasoning or constitutional
limitations that have supported traditional civil commitment laws
for decades.
This Note critiques the Supreme Court's analysis of statutes
providing for the involuntary commitment of sex offenders, and
attempts to predict the future of such statutes, particularly in light
of the recent review of Washington's sex offender statute in
Young.25 Additionally, it explores whether the Supreme Court
decisions have conformed to the policy reasoning behind the notion
of involuntary civil commitment, and suggests alternatives for the
future.26
Part I presents the background of civil commitment statutes,
including the history, Supreme Court analysis, criticism, and recent
bear on a court determining in the first instance whether Washington's
confinement scheme is civil. Here, we evaluate respondent's allegations
as presented in a double jeopardy and ex post facto challenge under the
assumption that the Act is civil.
Id.
25 Young, 121 S. Ct. 727 (2001).
26 This Note will not provide an in-depth analysis of the constitutional
implications of using civil commitment as a means of double punishment, nor
will it examine the application of these statutes to those offenders committed
before the laws were passed, as this has been covered extensively in other Notes.
See Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Addressing State
Statutes Pertaining to the Treatment, Registration and Community Notification
Requirements for Sexual Offenders, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (1996); Kimberly
A. Dorsett, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous
New Era in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 113 (1998); Brian D.
Gallagher, Now That We Know Where They Are, What Do We Do With Them?:
The Placement of Sex Offenders in the Age of Megan's Law, 7 WIDENER J.
PUBLIC L. 39 (1997); Christine M. Kong, Comment, The Neighbors Are
Watching: Targeting Sexual Predators with Community Notification Laws, 40
VILL. L. REv. 1257 (1995).
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developments. This part examines statutes from Washington,27
Kansas,2 8 Illinois, 29 Iowa3° and New Jersey, 31 providing a
sample of the types of statutes currently in existence. In addition,
Part I discusses the theory of Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("TJ") 3
2
and how it relates to sexual predator laws. TJ relies heavily on the
social sciences, and encourages social scientists to engage in
empirical research to measure the type of impact rules of law and
procedures have on people who become involved in the legal
system. 33 This part also discusses the TJ analyses already conduct-
ed in relation to sexual predator laws, and how future legislation
may be impacted by the results.
Part 1I examines current sex offender statutes and their
constitutional challenges as reviewed by the Supreme Court. In
particular, this part discusses the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,34 where the Court declared
current statutory schemes for the involuntary commitment of sex
offenders to be constitutional, 35 and Young, affirming the Hend-
ricks decision.36 It also presents opponents' criticisms of the two
decisions. Additionally, Part II looks at Turay v. Weston,37 a case
from the Western District of Washington, which held the state
statute unconstitutional as applied to those committed under it, and
ordered an injunction against the state until it complied with certain
27 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.09.902 (West 2000).
28 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-2986 (West 2000).
29 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 205/1.01-207/40 (2001).
30 IOWA CODE § 229A (1999).
3' N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 30:4-82.4 (West 2000).
32 See John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively
Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41
ARIZ. L. REv. 375 (1999). The theory of Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("TJ")
asserts that the rules and procedures of law, and how well legal 'players' play
their roles can have a positive or negative impact on the psychological well-being
of those who become involved in our legal system. Because of this, proponents
of TJ urge legislators and policy-makers to consider social science policies when
formulating new laws and procedures. Id. at 375.
" Id. at 375-76.
14 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
" Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
36 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 737.
37 Turay v. Weston, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash 2000).
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treatment provisions of the statute.38 Washington's SCC continues
to operate under injunction today.39
Finally, Part III focuses on the future of sex offender statutes,
and suggests alternatives to the utilization of current treatment
schemes. In particular Part III focuses on the Kansas statute, and
discusses why Kansas does not appear to be having the same
troubles that Washington is having, despite the fact that its sex
offender statute is modeled after Washington's. Additionally, this
part presents solutions to current sex offender statutes that would
shift their applicability back toward the underlying treatment goals
and away from a means of indefinite punishment.
I. TRADITIONAL INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
People with mental disabilities have endured centuries of
stigma, fear and hatred. In an effort to change this, the legal rights
movement for people with mental disabilities began in earnest in
the early 1970s.4' Inspired by the civil rights movement, attorneys
argued that the Constitution required that this group of individuals
to be treated humanely, and that they be provided with sanitary
living conditions and access to appropriate treatment for their
mental conditions. 4' Although judges eventually began to agree
with these attorneys, creating landmark decisions in cases such as
O'Connor v. Donaldson42 and Foucha v. Indiana,43 the struggle
to enforce the rights of the mentally disabled continues. This is
particularly evidenced in the litigation surrounding modern sex
offender laws. In spite of many positive changes throughout the last
thirty years, recent Supreme Court decisions in sex offender
38 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
39 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 732.
40 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2.
4' LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
42 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding, in part, that a non-dangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom cannot be constitutionally confined
to a mental hospital).
43 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that a person can only be confined as long
as he or she can be found to suffer from a mental illness that causes him or her
to be a danger to him or herself or others).
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litigation now threaten the foundation upon which traditional civil
commitment rests, sending years of advances back to the turn of
the century.
A. History
Proponents of involuntary civil commitment have justified its
use on two different public policy rationales: police power and the
theory of parens patriae.44 The police power justification asserts
that the state has a duty to protect society from dangerous individu-
als,45 while the idea of parens patriae allows the state to protect
the interests of the actual individual, by acting in the role of a
"parent" and confining the individual for his or her own good.46
In the late 1840s, based on these policies, the first institutions for
people with mental retardation began to operate in the United
States.47 At the time, proponents of institutions thought of these
places as a "creation of peace and order" that would cure insani-
ty.48 But, by the 1860s, it became clear that many in these
institutions were incurable, and hope for successful treatment began
to fade.49
By the end of the nineteenth century, the eugenics movement
began to sweep the nation, with many seeing mental disability as
the root of crime and poverty.5 ° Thousands of mentally disabled
44 See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15; see also Adam J. Falk,
Note, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitu-
tional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L.
& MED. 117 (1999).
45 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15-20.
46 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15-20. "The theory is that the state
has an obligation to protect the interests of those who cannot do so themselves,
even if it means overriding their decisions and, in some cases, confining them
involuntarily for their own good." LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15-20.
47 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17. The first institution was created
in Massachusetts, approved as a school for "pauper idiots." LEVY & RUBEN-
STEIN, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Herr, Rights and Advocacy for Retarded People
(1983)).
48 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17.
49 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17-18.
50 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 18. "The eugenicists' solution
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people were committed as a result. While the eugenics movement
began to lose momentum in the 1930s and 1940s, there was very
little judicial notice of involuntary commitment until the early
1970s, with prior cases mainly focusing on the legality of criminal
confinement under existing laws.5' The landmark decisions that
would follow, however, changed the face of involuntary commit-
ment permanently.
In 1975, the Court examined the limitations of civil commit-
ment for the first time in O'Connor v. Donaldson.5 2 Kenneth
Donaldson had been civilly committed in Florida, and was kept
there against his will for almost fifteen years.53 Throughout his
confinement, Donaldson had unsuccessfully petitioned for release,
claiming that he was not mentally ill, that he was not a danger to
himself or others, and that even if he was, the hospital he was
confined in was not providing him with adequate mental health
treatment.54 After losing in the district court and in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of "the important constitutional questions seemingly
presented.''55 After determining that Donaldson was, indeed, not
harmless to himself or others, the Supreme Court held that "a
finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement .... Moreover ... mere public intolerance
or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a
person's physical liberty., 56
called for the use of involuntary commitment laws to enforce the strict
segregation of mentally retarded people from society at large, in order to prevent
them from propogating." LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 18.
5 ' LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 18.
52 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
I d. at 564. Donaldson's confinement had been initiated by his father, who
claimed that his son was having delusions. Because the state law had very few
limitations on civil commitment, he was committed based on the judge's finding
that Donaldson suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 565.
54 Id. at 565.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 575.
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In 1992, the Supreme Court again addressed the limitations of
civil commitment in Foucha v. Louisiana.57 The Court was asked
to determine whether a person committed to a mental hospital
having been found guilty of a criminal charge by reason of insanity
can continue to be held there when there had been no finding of
mental illness to commit him in the first place.58 Terry Foucha
had been charged with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of
a firearm, but because he was found to have been insane at the
time he committed his crimes, the court ordered him to be
committed until he was deemed safe enough to be released.59 Four
years after his commitment, doctors recommended that Foucha be
released, as there was no evidence that he had ever suffered from
a mental illness.60 Despite the doctors' recommendation, Foucha
was not released, but instead ordered to remain confined, with the
Supreme Court of Louisiana holding that he had not "carried the
burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not
dangerous . .. and that neither the Due Process Clause nor the
Equal Protection Clause was violated by the statutory provision
permitting confinement of an insanity acquittee based on danger-
ousness alone."'6 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
before anyone can be confined involuntarily, there must be a
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers
from a mental illness and is a danger to self or others as a
result.62
Civil commitment statutes remain effective because they satisfy
three factors: (1) the person committed suffers from a mental
illness; (2) the person poses a danger to self or others as a result
of that illness; and (3) there is no lesser restrictive alternative to
conmmitment.63 These components have also led to constitutional
" 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
58 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 73.
'9 Id. at 73-74.
60 Id. at 74.
61 Id. at 75.
62 Id. at 86.
63 See, e.g., Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 576. "The doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative is based on the constitutional principle that, in pursuing
legitimate state interests, the government must use means that least restrict
889
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challenges to sex offender statutes that incorporate civil commit-
ment. Many such challengers cite the fact that while there are
provisions allowing for release to a less restrictive alternative, no
such alternative exists. 64 Nonetheless, sex offender statutes endure
in their present form, and continue to survive, despite many
seemingly unconstitutional applications.
B. Recent Trends in Civil Commitment: Sex Offender
Legislation
The courts have sent mixed messages in the field of sex
offender legislation, 65 even though they have continued to rely on
the policy and treatment goals behind traditional civil commitment
statutes explored in cases such as those already discussed above.66
The analysis is more difficult because modem sexual predator
statutes blur the line between civil laws, which are treatment-
oriented, and criminal laws, which are designed to punish specific
behavior. In pertaining to sex offenders, the statutes provide that
civil commitment becomes an option after the offender has already
served time in prison.67 This leads to Due Process and Double
Jeopardy concerns. 68 The goals behind all of the statutes purport
to be treatment-oriented,69 which supports the Supreme Court's
fundamental personal liberties." LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32.
64 See, e.g., Hunter T. George, Criteria Proposed for Housing Sex Offenders,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at B8. After monitoring Washington State's
program for sex offenders for almost six years, U.S. District Judge William
Dwyer has "threatened the state with big fines if ... [a] 'less restrictive
alternative' to incarceration in the center isn't developed." Id.
65 See, e.g., Young, 121 S. Ct. at 727; compare with Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
371 (Young held that Washington State's civil commitment scheme is constitu-
tional despite inadequate mental health care, while Hendricks held that Kansas'
civil commitment scheme, modeled after Washington's, is constitutional because
it provides for mental health treatment and a means for release to a less
restrictive alternative).
66 See supra Part L.A (discussing Donaldson and Foucha).
67 See, e.g.,WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030.
68 See Young, 121 S. Ct. at 727; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350; Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 365 (1986).
69 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2000). As a basis
for enacting its sex offender law, the Washington State legislature found that "the
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finding that these statutes are civil on their face. The assumption
that these statutes are civil because the state legislators say they are
civil, however, has led the Court to make decisions that do not
comport with those in the traditional civil commitment arena.
Modem civil commitment statutes for sexual predators have
changed significantly since those enacted in the early 1950s.7°
Current laws are designed to handle sex offenders considered to be
a high risk for committing additional sex crimes. They apply to
people who have served their criminal sentence, and are going to
be released from prison. Procedurally, these statutes follow a
similar scheme. When a convicted sex offender is about to be
released from prison, the local prosecutor from the county that
originally handled the case is notified by the state and asked if he
or she wants to pursue a civil commitment.71 If the prosecutor
wishes to do so, a hearing is held to determine whether the
convicted offender is too dangerous to be released.7 z The state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual suffers
from some type of mental disability that would make him likely to
commit a future act of sexual violence.73 "If a judge or jury
treatment needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment
modalities for this population are very different than the traditional treatment
modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment
act." Id.
" See Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the
Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators - A Due Process
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 595 (1997). In the early 1930s and 1940s,
mental retardation was seen as a major reason behind crime and poverty,
resulting in an increase in involuntary institutionalization. LEVY & RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 18-19. De-institutionalization began in the mid 1950s, due in
part to the introduction of psychotropic drugs and the increased awareness of
deplorable conditions. In the 1970s, several reforms to commitment standards
further decreased the number of involuntary commitments. LEVY & RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 18-19.
71 How Sex Offenders Are Committed to McNeil Island Center, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (2000), KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 2000), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West 2000).
72 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050.
71 See, e.g., id. § 71.09 (requiring a finding of "mental abnormality or
personality disorder"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (requiring a finding of
"suffering from mental disorder"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (requiring a
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determines that the individual is a sexual predator, then he is
committed to a high security facility for 'control, care, and
treatment' until he is safe to be released back into the community.
Commitment is indefinite."74 These mechanics can be seen
particularly in states such as Washington, Kansas, Illinois, Iowa
and New Jersey.
1. Washington
The Washington State legislature was the first to address civil
commitment for sex offenders, out of response to a horrific crime.
In 1987, Earl Shriner was released from prison, where he had been
serving nearly eleven years for multiple sexual assaults. 75 Despite
a criminal history dating back to 1966, the state considered Shriner
extremely dangerous, but not amenable to psychiatric treatment.76
Two years after his release, Shriner violently strangled, stabbed,
raped and sexually mutilated a seven-year old boy.77 As a result
of the huge public outcry, the Task Force on Community Protec-
tion7 8 was established to examine how to deal with sexual preda-
finding of "mental abnormality").
74 La Fond, supra note 32, at 380 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§71.09.060(1) (West Supp. 1999)).
71 See Don Carter, Shriner Must Never Go Free, Judge Rules, SEATTLE P.I.,
Mar. 27, 1990, at Al; Andrea Gross, The Little Boy from Tacoma; Sexual
Assault, LADIES HOME JOURNAL, May 1990, at 160; Letters, More on Child
Rape - Shriner Case an Example of Blatant Societal Hypocrisy, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1990, at A19; Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators'; A Public
Outcry in Washington State Targeted Repeat Violent Sex Criminals. A New
Preventive Law Would Keep Them in Jail Indefinitely, L.A. TIMES, May 10,
1990, at Al.
76 Carter, supra note 75, at Al.
77 Carter, supra note 75, at Al.
78 See Debra Carlton Harrell, Legislators Vow Action on Violent Sex
Offenders, SEATTLE P.I., Jan. 9, 1990, at Al. In 1989, Washington Governor
Booth Gardner appointed King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng as Chairman of
the twenty-four-member Task Force on Community Protection, comprised of
prosecutors, advocates and family members of those murdered in heinous, sex-
related crimes. Id. Members included Helen Harlow, mother of the seven-year
old victim of Earl Shriner, and Ida Ballasioles, mother of Diane Ballasioles, who
was murdered by a violent rapist in Seattle's Pioneer Square. Other members
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tors effectively in the existing criminal system.7 9 Based on the
studies of this task force, the 1990 Community Protection Act was
passed.8°
The 1990 Community Protection Act has fourteen sections
addressing issues related to violent crimes, and in particular, violent
sexual crimes. 8' These provisions, among other things, increase
82 83sentences for sexual crimes, require community registration,
and even provide for monetary compensation for victims. 84 The
Act also includes the Sexually Violent Predator Code,85 which
authorizes the indefinite commitment of defendants deemed to be
"sexually violent predators. 86
included Pierce County Prosecutor John Ladenburg. See Debra Carlton Harrell,
Sex-Predator Safeguards Supported; Gardner and Maleng Stress Need for Unity,
SEATTLE P.I., Jan. 5, 1990, at B3; Michele Matassa Flores, South End
Lawmakers Draw Agenda, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at B3; Diana Meredith,
Eikenberry Urges Tough Sex-Crime Sentences, SEATrLE P.I., Jan. 4, 1990, at B3.
79 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2000).
80 Id. § 71.09.
81 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 746.
82 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.20 (West 2001).
83 Id. § 9A.44.130.
84 Id. § 7.68.035.
85 Id. § 71.09.
86 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 746.
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2. Kansas
Kansas' statute, the 1994 Sexually Violent Predator Act,87 is
modeled after Washington's 1990 Community Protection Act. The
Act established a plan for civil commitment to provide long term
care and treatment for violent sexual predators.8" The statute
defines a sexual predator as "any person who has been convicted
of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from
a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.,
89
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the statute's
civil commitment procedure satisfies due process requirements, and
does not violate the Constitution's Double Jeopardy or Ex Post
Facto Clauses,90 paving the way for other states to overcome
constitutional challenges to their own statutes.
3. Illinois
Illinois' statute, the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,91
has also been upheld by the Supreme Court.9 2 The Court's
87 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
The Legislature finds that there exists an extremely dangerous group
of sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality or personali-
ty disorder. Because the existing civil commitment procedures under
K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto are inadequate to
address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks
they present to society, the legislature finds that a separate involuntary
commitment process for the potentially long-term control, care and
treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary.
Id.
88 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
89 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 2000).
90 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
9' 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (2000).
9' Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
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decision in Allen v. Illinois93 provided the initial support that the
modem sexual predator laws were civil, not criminal, in nature.94
Under the Illinois Act, the state is required to provide care and
treatment for persons deemed sexually dangerous in a facility set
aside to provide psychiatric care, until the person is no longer
found to be dangerous.95
In Allen, the court determined that the Illinois statute was civil
in nature, partly because the Act "established a system under which
committed persons may be released after the briefest time in
confinement," and were free to "apply for release at any time."96
This has become very important in recent cases where judges have
determined that some specific sexual predator statutes are in fact
criminal and not civil in nature, because they do not incorporate
either element of conditional release.97
4. Iowa
Iowa has one of the newest sexual predator statutes modeled
after Washington's.98 The Act was passed in 1998, and with only
a dozen offenders assigned to the program, Iowa is already
claiming its statute to be successful. 99 In a recently released report
about the program, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller noted that
the offenders were making progress and the state should develop
plans for their release.'00 Miller also noted that part of what has
made this program so successful is that it "can be completed within
three to five years, if the patient is cooperative and motivated to
93 id.
9' Id. at 375 (holding that the statute was civil in nature for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination).
95 Id. at 369-70.
96 id.
97 See, e.g., Young, 898 F. Supp at 752. Although Washington's Act was
held to violate the Constitution in this case, it has since been amended to include
provisions for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative. WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §71.09.090 (West 2000).
98 IOWA CODE § 229A (1999).
99 See William Petroski, Sex Offender Treatment Program Appears
Successful, DES MoINES REGISTER, June 22, 2000, at 1.
1oo Id.
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change."'0 ' Skeptics of the program, however, are concerned that
the treatment provided in the Iowa program might not be meaning-
ful.10 2 In a recent interview with the Des Moines Register, Ben
Stone, Director of the Iowa Civil Liberties Union, said that if no
meaningful treatment is provided, the civil commitment provided




New Jersey legislators reacted strongly to public outcry over
Megan Kanka's rape and murder, creating the now well-known
"Megan's Law."' 4 The law was enacted after seven year-old
Kanka was raped and murdered in her neighborhood by a convicted
sex offender living across the street.1°5 The law, however, has
had its own troubles; it only recently became enforceable again




'04 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-82.4 (West 2000).
" Michael Booth, Sex-Offender Bills Awaiting Signature, N.J. L.J., Oct. 24,
1994, at 8. The group of bills known as "Megan's Law" were introduced after
the July 29, 1994, rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by Jesse
Timmendequas, a 33-year-old convicted sex offender who lived across the street
from Kanka. Kanka's parents, horrified that they had not been notified that
Timmendequas was a sex offender, began a public movement that led to the
legislation being introduced in both houses. In addition to measures requiring
community notification and establishment of a central registry of sex offenders,
the bills:
1) make sex offenders serving sentences at the Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center in Avenel ineligible for good behavior credits unless
they cooperate with the treatment program there; 2) require lifetime
supervision for convicted sex offenders; 3) require that victims of sex
crimes be notified when the convict is about to be released; 4) mandate
that sex offenders provide a blood specimen for DNA analysis and
establish a database for the results; and 5) allow for a prison term of
30 years to life if a person is convicted of an aggravated sexual assault
that involves violence and a victim who is 16 years old or younger.
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Law" community notifications."°6 The decision lifting the ban
was affirmed in early September 2000 by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, which grappled with the question of whether residents
who refused to sign confidentiality agreements should receive
notification of a sex offender's whereabouts.
10 7
Under New Jersey guidelines, the confidentiality agreements
contain provisions that bind the signer from releasing the offender's
home address except to those who necessarily need to know - for
example school principals - and specifies that violating these
provisions could result in court sanctions. 8 New Jersey's law
requires sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement
officials upon release, who then notify residents, schools and other
organizations that an offender lives nearby.'0 9 The law was
originally much narrower in scope than other state statutes that
allow Internet and telephone hotline notifications. Recently,
however, by a 1.1 million vote margin, voters in New Jersey have
allowed the release of sex offender information via the Internet,
which may bring a flood of constitutional challenges."0
"o6 Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2000). In April 2000, Third
Circuit Judge Dolores Sloviter issued an injunction on notification of an
offender's whereabouts, citing arguments that the notification practice violates
the offender's privacy rights. Id.
107 Farmer, 227 F.3d at 98. In her decision, Judge Maryanne Trump Barry
said that notifying neighbors who promise not to divulge the information to
school and community organizations of the whereabouts of a sex offender does
not violate the offender's right to privacy. Id.; see also Karen DeMasters,
Briefing: Megan's Law Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 6.
18 Farmer, 227 F.3d at 103.
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-82.4 (West 2000).
110 Henry Gottlieb, By a 1.1 Million-Vote Margin ... N.J. L.J., Nov. 13,
2000, at 1. On November 7, 2000, the people of New Jersey approved an
Internet registry of the state's sex offenders by a 1.1 million-vote margin.
[B]ut the scope of the Web site eventually may be determined by the
... Supreme Court. Proponents and critics of the plan to make the
names and whereabouts of Megan's Law available online said after the
vote that they expect federal constitutional challenges if the site
includes the addresses of former sex offenders, as many other states
do.
Id. Compare with ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(a)(2) (2000) (providing for notice
"distribution of a community notification flyer" by posting it on the Internet or
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C. Criticism of Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders
Since their inception, sex offender laws have been met with
criticism by organizations such as the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), and many state psychiatric associations. 1 '
These organizations believe strongly that "[c]ivil commitment is a
profound abridgment of individual liberties that has continuing
consequences after release."" 2 Not only are critics of civil com-
mitment opposed to the idea because of the loss of liberty it
imposes, but also to the stigma that results, causing problems in
finding housing, education and employment opportunities. 1 3
Furthermore, critics argue that it is "unreasonable to single out
mentally disordered people for ... detention based simply on a
prediction of future dangerousness, when other people cannot be
confined without having violated the criminal law.1 4 In fact,
opponents of the civil commitment of sex offenders believe that the
statutes allowing such commitment are "neither medically nor
constitutionally sound."' 15
Both the ACLU and psychiatric groups are concerned about
problem sex offenders, but they are more concerned that current
statutes are not correctly solving the problems." 6 Their primary
by "other means available"); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3827 (2000) (requiring the
Department of Public Safety to maintain a sex offender website on the Internet
with information for the public); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1999)
(allowing access to sex offender registration information through a 900 telephone
number).
.. See Ron Judd, Psychiatrists Challenge State's Law on Sexual Predators,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at Al. When Washington State's Community
Protection Act passed the state legislature in 1990, members of the Washington
State Psychiatric Association joined the ACLU in protest, by filing an amicus
brief on behalf of Andre Brigham Young, calling the statute "a denial of every
fundamental value, which makes American criminal justice so unique and
treasured." Id.
1.2 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22.
113 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22.
114 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22.
1' Judd, supra note 111, at Al.
116 Judd, supra note 111, at Al.
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criticism is that "sex offender legislation ... defines mental illness
by a category of crime ... [and] [t]o state that all sex offenders
have a mental illness is an assumption that's probably not
true.' ' 117 Critics further argue that judges upholding the statutes,
do so to "avoid what's right for what's politically expedient."' 1
8
This is clearly the situation in the recent Young case. In order to
uphold Washington's statute, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
constitutional principles laid out in their previous decisions, such
as Foucha and Donaldson, allowing the unrestrained confinement
of sex predators for an indeterminate period of time after they have
completed their criminal sentences. 9 In Foucha the Supreme
Court ruled that a state cannot commit a person who is potentially
dangerous to the community without a specific finding of mental
illness by clear and convincing evidence. 20 Moreover, the court
noted that "antisocial personality" or "personal disorder" are not
considered mental illnesses.1 2' Yet, sex offenders are committed
under a broad definition of mental illness, and are then left to
spend their days hoping to receive treatment that may not exist. In
Young, the Court rejected this as a constitutional violation.1 22
This criticism has been met with reproach by state prosecu-
tors. 23 They believe that these civil commitment provisions
reflect "the concerns [legislators] heard from citizens" and are just
a small part of larger schemes that "[double] prison time for sex
offenders, [allow] police to notify community members when sex
offenders are released to live in their neighborhood, [require] sex
offenders to register, and [reduce] the amount of 'good time'
117 Judd, supra note 111, at Al. Dr. John Chiles, president of the Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association, also said that "[tihe law represents a misuse
of a civil commitment proceeding designed to protect individuals with diagnosed
mental disorders." Judd, supra note 111, at Al.
118 Terry Tang, Popular Result at the Cost of a Dangerous Precedent,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at B4.
"' See supra Part I.B (discussing recent trends in sex offender legislation).
120 Foucha, 504. U.S. at 86.
121 Id. at 75.
122 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 737.
123 See, e.g., Norm Maleng, Law Gives Public Right to Treat Sex Offenders,
SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at B5 (Norm Maleng was Prosecuting Attorney
in King County, located in Washington State, at the time of this response).
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deducted from prison sentences of sex offenders." ' 4 Furthermore,
supporters of the civil commitment of sex offenders believe that
although the ultimate goal of these statutes is to treat mental
illness, the "immediate purpose is to ensure the commitment of
these persons in order to protect the community."'' 25 However,
this justification simply does not comport with Supreme Court
precedent which has expanded the rights of those who are mentally
ill over the past thirty years.
26
D. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Its Effect on Sexual
Predator Laws
Public policy justifies civil commitment on the two rationales
of police power and parens patriae.127 Both of these theories
have also been used to support sex offender commitments, but
critics feel that despite the policy behind these two rationales, civil
commitment does not accomplish the goal of treatment and
improvement, instead it compromises individual autonomy and
liberty. 2 s One legal movement that attempts to change this
apparent disparity is Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ), which is the
study of the role of law as a therapeutic agent. 2 9 At its inception,
TJ was a way to look at mental health law, but has evolved into "a
therapeutic perspective on the law in general ... that is truly
interdisciplinary as well as international in scope.' 130
124 Id. at B5.
125 Id. at B5.
126 See supra Part I (discussing the history of civil commitment).
127 See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22; see also Falk, supra note
44, at 117.
121 See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23. Critics argue that: (1) civil
commitment causes a "profound abridgment of individual liberties that has
continuing consequences after release"; (2) "treatment may be either impossible
or unacceptably compromised when accompanied by the use of force"; and (3)
"there is no assurance that involuntary commitment accomplishes the goal of
treatment and improvement of the subject's mental condition." LEVY &
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23; see also Falk, supra note 44, at 117.
129 David B. Wexler, Introduction to the Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Symposium, 41 ARmZ. L. REV. 263 (1999).
130 Id. at 263.
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The laws surrounding violent sexual predators are particularly
interesting to analyze from the perspective of TJ, primarily because
the policy behind these laws is to treat offenders, not punish them.
TJ examines the effects that these laws have not only on the
offenders themselves, but also on those who work with sex
offenders, and the effects on society at large.
13
'
Using a TJ analysis, critics of civil commitment provisions for
sex offenders have described many antitherapeutic effects on those
committed. 132 One effect that can be seen is that by labeling sex
offenders as suffering from a mental illness, it "may diminish their
own sense of responsibility and decrease their ability to conform
to society's expectations."'' 33 Moreover, it "may also adversely
affect treatment by discouraging sex offenders from taking
responsibility for their conduct and for changing how they think
about their behavior."'' 34 A problem that arises from sexual
predator statutes is the counter effect of delaying treatment until
after a criminal sentence has been served. Proponents of TJ believe
that immediate treatment is more likely to be effective. 135 It is
argued that "[a] delay in treatment ... can further reinforce the
offender's deviant attitudes and behavior patterns making them
more chronic."
136
Proponents of TJ assert that current legislation aimed at sex
offenders not only harms those committed under the law, but also
131 See Leonore M.J. Simon, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Sex Offender
Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485
(1999); Falk, supra note 44, at 117.
132 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 401.
113 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 401.
134 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 401. Further criticism of labeling sex
offenders as mentally abnormal is that:
Labeling sex offenders as "violent sexual predators" therefore may
reinforce their antisocial sexual behavior. The label may function to get
in the way of change and provide these individuals with an excuse for
giving in to their sexual urges. As a result, it may make it more
difficult for sex offenders to exercise the self-control that society
would like to encourage.
La Fond, supra note 32, at 401.
135 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 401.
136 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 401.
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has harmful effects on those protected by the law.'37 For exam-
ple, laws designed to address rape by strangers may create an
unnatural fear among women who mistakenly believe that stranger
rape occurs more often than acquaintance rape.'38 "Women who
take preventive measures to guard against becoming victims of
stranger rape and sexual assault may not take precautionary
measures against [rape] by acquaintances."'' 39 Furthermore,
victims are often affected adversely by the legal system itself.'
40
Those that have conducted studies in this area have found that:
One can see most glaringly the adverse effect of the
victim-offender relationship on the legal processing of
criminal cases in the area of domestic violence. The area
of sex offenses is analogous, in that victims who have a
prior relationship with the offender are not treated serious-
ly and respectfully by themselves, by social others and by
the legal system. 141
Others have found specific effects that these laws have on
clinicians who work with sexual predators at commitment facilities,
the effect on judges and police, the effect on legislators, and the
effect on public policy. 42
In examining the effects that sex offender laws have on
clinicians, one major finding is that frustration is a direct result of
the law.143 "[P]atients coerced into treatment may only participate
in a formal way and may not have the motivation and commitment
necessary for successful treatment. This causes [the] therapists
dedicated to helping sex offenders to feel frustrated, and it may
137 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 131, at 495-99.
138 Simon, supra note 131, at 495-96.
139 Simon, supra note 131, at 496.
'40 See Simon, supra note 131, at 526.
141 Simon, supra note 131, at 526.
142 See La Fond, supra note 32, at 409-410. La Fond examines the views of
Professor David Wexler, who sees TJ simply as a way of examining law and
public policy, and the alternative views of Professor Bruce J. Winick, who thinks
that "law ... ought to be shaped so as to maximize its positive impact while
minimizing its negative impact as much as possible." La Fond, supra note 31,
at 375.
143 La Fond, supra note 32, at 404-405.
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raise ethical concerns as well."' 44 Additionally, laws can have
devastating effects on judges, especially those who are elected,
such as those in Washington. As a result of being elected, judges
"generally rule in favor of the prosecution on all contested trial
issues."' 115 This can cause resentment among the public and create
an environment of distrust in the legal system.
Future legislation will benefit and improve only if policy
makers and judges, and all others who help to shape our laws, take
all of these therapeutic considerations into account when respond-
ing to horrific crimes and public outcry. By incorporating TJ into
the law-making process, states have greater chances of moving
back toward treatment policies behind civil commitments of sexual
offenders, and away from the indefinite criminal punishment that
appears to be the actual effect of the laws today.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF SEX OFFENDER
STATUTES
Despite efforts by practitioners in the field of mental health
law, as well as scholars in legal fields such as TJ, the Supreme
Court has shifted its view on civil commitment in regards to sex
offenders, as highlighted in the cases of Hendricks and Young.
Because of this, it is almost certain that there will never be another
Supreme Court challenge to sex offender statutes as they exist now,
leaving those committed with very few remedies to answer the
violations of their constitutional rights.
144 La Fond, supra note 32, at 404-405. "The ethics codes of several mental
health professional groups stress that treatment should be provided on a voluntary
basis and raise serious concerns about the propriety of treating patients against
their will." La Fond, supra note 32, at 405.
14' La Fond, supra note 32, at 406.
903
904 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. Kansas v. Hendricks146
The Supreme Court's decisive opinion in Hendricks has had
severe ramifications on the future of sex offender laws. 147 When
the decision came down, many critics believed that states would no
longer have to prove a true therapeutic goal, and that a mere
appearance of treatment would be sufficient. 148 Moreover, "public
policy and discourse of public policy may now focus on pure social
defense through containment rather that on providing help to those
in need.' ' 149 This apparently held true. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have held that a sex offender statute containing the same
type of scheme as that of the Kansas statute is civil on its face,
146 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In this case, Hendricks, a Kansas state prisoner,
was found by a jury to be a sexually violent predator shortly before he was to
be released to a halfway house after completing his criminal sentence. During his
initial trial, Hendricks had agreed with the state physician's diagnosis that he
suffered from pedophilia. The trial court then found that as a matter of state law
pedophilia qualified as a "mental abnormality" under Kansas' Sexually Violent
Predator Act. Hendricks was then ordered to civil commitment pursuant to that
act. On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Hendricks alleged that the Act
violated the U.S. Constitution's Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post
Facto clauses. The Kansas Supreme court agreed, holding that the Act violated
the prisoner's substantive due process rights under the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment, in that the Act's definition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy
the Supreme Court's "mental illness" requirement in the civil commitment
context, and did not address the double jeopardy or ex post facto claims. See In
re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996). The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act's definition of
mental abnormality satisfied substantive due process requirements, and that the
Act did not violate either the double jeopardy clause or the ex post facto clause
of the Federal Constitution. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
147 Falk, supra note 44, at 147. In his Note, Falk asserts that the "Hendricks
standard undermines the moral foundation of criminal law and the moral
neutrality of the mental health system." Falk, supra note 44, at 147.
148 See Constitutional Law - Due Process (excused) - Minnesota Supreme
Court Upholds Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 113 HARV. L. REv.
1228 (2000); La Fond, supra note 32, at 409-410; see also Mike Carter, Sex
Offender Center: 10 Years of Trouble, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at Al.
149 La Fond, supra note 32, at 410.
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based solely on the analysis already conducted in Hendricks.5 °
This effectively defeats all challenges based on a violation of the
double jeopardy clause. Moreover, the Court has used the Hen-
dricks analysis to support the broader conclusion that as long as a
state provides treatment to sex offenders - whether that treatment
is adequate as applied to a specific offender - its statute will be
deemed civil in nature, not penal. Once a state's statutory scheme
is deemed civil on its face, it cannot be unconstitutional because
there are adequate means to remedy the treatment program by the
state's own courts.
15 1
Arguably, the Hendricks Court did not enunciate the correct
analysis, thus the statutes that have relied on Hendricks' constitu-
tionality are questionable as well. 5 2 For example, while the
Hendricks Court held that statutes such as Kansas' are not punitive
in nature, it did not address the fact that there is no known
effective treatment for sex offenders. Instead, the Court dismissed
this fallacy by stating that "[w]e have already observed that, under
the appropriate circumstances and when accompanied by proper
procedures, incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil
law."' 53 Because of this omission, the Court left open the follow-
ing question: When one of the required elements of a statute is
effective treatment, how can the statute be constitutional if this
element can not be accomplished?
The Court directly addressed this question in Young. The Court
explained that in Hendricks it had:
acknowledged that not all mental conditions were treatable.
For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however,
"' See, e.g., Young, 121 U.S. at 737 (holding Washington's statutory scheme
to be civil because the same type of scheme was already determined to be civil
in Hendricks).
151 Id.
152 See Carter, supra note 148, at Al. Critics such as Professor John La Fond
fear that the law has become "a ruse to indefinitely detain someone... that was
never enacted to ... offer [offenders] treatment and a way back into the
community." Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
153 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66 (dismissing the Kansas Supreme Court's
conclusion that "the treatment for sexually violent predators is all but non
existent" and "[t]he legislature concedes that sexually violent predators are not
amenable to treatment").
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
we explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to
their civil confinement, because the State had an interest in
protecting the public from dangerous individuals with
treatable as well as untreatable conditions.
15 4
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the majority failed to
consider that, if proved, Young's allegations of improper treatment
would help establish that the statute should be characterized as
criminal in nature, thereby leading to a breakdown in the Hendricks
analysis, which assumes the statutory scheme to be civil in na-
ture. "'
B. Seling v. Young
Washington State has become the focus of sex offender
legislation, due to the January 2001 review of its statute. 156 Andre
4 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 734.
155 Id. at 742-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Also making recent headlines is convicted rapist Mitch Gaff. Despite
being Washington's first ever convicted sexual predator to receive the SCC's
recommendation for release, he too has become a victim of Washington's
indefinite civil commitment. See Washington v. Gaff, 954 P.2d 943 (Wash.
1998). Gaff was civilly committed after serving ten years in prison for the brutal
rapes of two teenage girls. During his initial evaluation for civil commitment,
Gaff was interviewed by the state psychologist about his history of sexual
misconduct, and admitted that "he [had made] numerous obscene phone calls
and [had committed] a variety of sexual assaults, including six rapes." Id. at 945.
He was committed based, in part, on these admissions. On August 18, 2000, after
having resided at the SCC since 1995, Gaff failed to convince a jury that he was
ready for restricted release, even though he had come to the hearing with support
from the SCC's administrators. Keiko Morris & Mike Carter, Jurors Reject
Request to Free 8-Time Rapist, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 19, 2000, at Al. Mitch
Gaff's SCC doctors and therapists consider him "one of the most sincere and
hard working of the sexual offenders undergoing therapy . . . [a]nd he was the
center's first chance to demonstrate that its residents do have a chance of
returning to society." Id. The twelve-member jury, which is required under the
Washington statute for all residents who petition for release, see WASH. REV.
CODE ANN.§ 71.09.090, unanimously voted to reject the recommendation,
preventing Gaff from becoming the first resident of the SCC to be released with
the blessings of SCC authorities. See Jury: Rapist Must Remain in Commitment
Center, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 18, 2000, at B 1 [hereinafter Rapist Must Remain].
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Brigham Young was the first to challenge his commitment to the
SCC as unconstitutional. 157 Between 1960 and 1990, Young had
been convicted of six rapes, and served approximately twenty-seven
years in prison for those convictions. One day prior to release for
his most recent conviction in October 1990, Washington State filed
to have him civilly committed. 158 After being committed, Young
appealed, arguing that the Act under which he was committed
violated the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto and
Equal Protection Clauses. Young lost the appeal, and remained at
the SCC throughout a number of subsequent challenges to the
Act. 159 On October 31, 2000, the Supreme Court heard arguments
on the issue of whether the SCC constitutes double punishment for
the same offense in violation of double jeopardy clause, and
whether the Washington statute should apply to Young because it
was passed after he was convicted of his crime in violation of the
ex post facto doctrine. 160 The Court ultimately determined wheth-
er Young could "challenge the statute as being punitive 'as-applied'
to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
clauses.' 61
In spite of the Hendricks analysis, Young asked the Court to
find that even though the statute is not unconstitutional on its face,
it is unconstitutional "as-applied" to him because the SCC cannot
provide adequate mental health treatment as mandated in the
statute, and therefore results in double punishment for a crime for
which he already served time in prison. 162 But the Court dis-
agreed with this analysis, and found that the statute could not be
challenged "as-applied." 163
On January 17, 2001, in an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court
157 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (holding that "RCW 71.09 is
civil rather than criminal, and does not violate either the prohibition against ex
post facto laws or the double jeopardy clause," and further holding "that the
basic statutory scheme implicates no substantive due process concerns").
158 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 731.
159 See id., 121 S. Ct. at 732.
'60 Sarah Duran, Offender's Day in Court; Constitutional? U.S. Supreme
Court to Review Sex Predator Law, NEWS TRIBuNE, Oct. 29, 2000, at Al.
161 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 730.
162 Id. at 731.
163 Id. at 737.
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affirmed the constitutionality of Washington's statute, holding that
Young could not "obtain release through an 'as-applied' challenge
... [because] an 'as-applied' analysis would prove unwork-
able."' '6 While Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, disagreed with
the holding, the majority came to its conclusion by assuming the
civil nature of Washington's statute, and determining that the
proper remedy for Young would be more appropriately brought
through state challenges. 165 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, explained that Washington's Act was civil on its face, as
supported by the Court's decision in Hendricks, where the Court
determined that Kansas' statute, modeled after Washington's, was
civil and not criminal in nature. 66 Based on this reasoning,
Justice O'Connor noted that "[a]n Act, found to be civil, cannot be
deemed punitive 'as-applied' to a single individual in violation of
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause
for release.',
167
While attorneys for Young did not expect a miracle, they
acknowledged that a win would not necessarily mean that Young
would leave the SCC. 168 Instead, they hoped for a ruling that
would force the state to use other means to deal with convicted sex
'64 Id. at 735.
165 Id. at 736 (determining that "State courts, in addition to federal courts,
remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges to civil confinement
schemes arising under the Federal Constitution" and that the Washington
Supreme Court has already held that the Washington Act is civil in nature").
166 Id. at 734. Justice O'Connor, discussing the reasoning behind Hendricks,
noted several factors which led to the conclusion that the Act was civil and not
criminal in nature.
The Act did not implicate retribution or deterrence; prior criminal
convictions were used as evidence in the commitment proceedings, but
were not a prerequisite to confinement; the Act required no finding of
scienter to commit a person; the Act was not intended to function as
a deterrent; and although the procedural safeguards were similar to
those in the criminal context, they did not alter the character of the
scheme.
Id. (citing 521 U.S. at 361-365).
167 Id. at 737.
168 Duran, supra note 160, at Al. "The odds are we will have opinion from
the court next spring, we'll go to [Washington Federal Court] in the summer, and
it will be 11 years of incarceration." Duran, supra note 160, at Al.
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offenders, including passing longer criminal sentences or commit-
ting them to mental hospitals rather than the SCC. 16 9 Despite
losing their Supreme Court challenge in January, Young's attorneys
appear to have received what they asked for. In its decision, the
majority specifically noted that "it is for the Washington courts to
determine whether the SCC is operating in accordance with state
laws and provide a remedy."17 Furthermore, the Court noted that
state courts are competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges of
this type, and the current injunction against DSHS appears to be
providing an adequate remedy.171
In his quest to be released, Young had several favorable
judgments on his side. Convicted of six rapes in three different
counties, Young served twenty-seven years in prison from 1963 to
1990.172 He was sent to the SCC in March of 1991, just shortly
after the new Community Protection Act was passed in 1990.173
After losing his case in Washington State Supreme Court,
1 74
Young challenged the constitutionality of the SCC in a federal
lawsuit in 1994.' That was the same year that Judge Dwyer
imposed an injunction on DSHS, ordering the department to make
improvements to the SCC or face large fines. 176 In 1995, Young
won his federal suit in front of Judge John Coughenour in the
District Court for the Western District of Washington, but was not
released because of a pending appeal. 7 7 In June of 1997, the
Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals sent Young's case back to federal district court.
In 1998, Judge Coughenour held that Young's commitment was
169 Duran, supra note 160, at Al. While longer criminal sentences may mean
longer jail time, it also means a definite release date, something that current SCC
residents do not enjoy.
17 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 736.
171 Id. at 736-37.
172 Sarah Duran, Sidebar: The Case History, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, Oct. 29,
2000, at Al.
173 Id.
174 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
175 Duran, supra note 172, at Al (discussing 1994 federal challenge).
176 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148.
17 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 744.
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constitutional based on the Hendricks decision. 78 In 1999, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Young should have been
granted a hearing about the specific conditions in Washington, and
ordered a hearing in federal district court. 17 9 In March of 2000,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
0
Prior to the Hendricks decision, Judge Coughenour gave a
thorough constitutional analysis of the Washington State statute in
his 1995 opinion.' 8 He explained that Young's commitment did
not meet constitutional standards because the statute does not
require that he be mentally ill in order to detain him. 82 "The
essential component missing from the Sexually Violent Predator
Statute is the requirement that the detainee be mentally ill. Like the
scheme rejected in Foucha, the [s]tatute here permits indefinite
incarceration based on little more than a showing of potential
future dangerousness."'' 83 Judge Coughenour went on to point out
that the absence of a requirement of mental illness is apparent in
reading the statute itself, as well as in the legislative history. 4
The absence of the requirement of a mental illness, according to
Judge Coughenour, violated the substantive protections of the Due
Process Clause. 8
5
Judge Coughenour further decided that the statute could not be
classified as civil, as Washington State had claimed, but must be
classified as criminal based on several factors. First, he determined
17' Duran, supra note 172, at Al.
"9 Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999).
180 Seling v. Young, 120 S. Ct. 1416 (2000); Duran, supra note 172, at Al.
181 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 744.
182 Id. at 749.
183 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 749 (referring to Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 86 (1992), where the Supreme Court held that due process rights are violated
where release from a mental institution is denied even though the confined
person is no longer mentally ill and prosecution has failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of danger to society).
,4 Id. at 750. "The Governor's Task Force on Community Protection, whose
proposed bill was substantially similar to that enacted, plainly intended to craft
legislation to permit the involuntary commitment of persons who are not
mentally ill." (citing Task Force on Community Protection, Final Report to Booth
Gardner, Governor, State of Washington, 11-21 (1989)). Id.
'85 Id. at 751.
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that the statute "subjects individuals to an affirmative restraint. The
statute entails a complete loss of freedom for an indefinite period
of time."' 186 Furthermore, Washington's statute did not provide for
conditional release of offenders who have not been determined with
certainty to be dangerous, resulting in longer terms of confine-
ment. 187 Second, Judge Coughenour pointed out that the statute
only applies to behavior that is already criminal, in that it is only
applied to those individuals who have already been charged with
a crime.188 Finally, Judge Coughenour explored the idea that the
Statute will promote retribution and deterrence, the traditional aims
of punishment, as opposed to the goal of treatment necessary for
civil commitments. 189 He contrasted the decision in Allen, 190
explaining that "[i]n Allen the Supreme Court determined that
because Illinois disavowed any interest in punishment and was
focused solely on providing treatment to mentally disordered sex
offenders, its commitment statute was civil, rather than crimi-
nal."'19' Because of these reasons, the statute was found to be in
violation of the ex post facto prohibition of the Constitution. 92
Additionally, Judge Coughenour found the statute to be in
violation of the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. He stated
that, "[h]aving once been punished for the commission of a violent
sexual offense, the offender [was] subject to further incarceration
under the statute's commitment scheme. The punishment imperative
embodied in the statutory approach ... render[ed] the Statute
unconstitutional." 193
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Hendricks further
supports these arguments by reminding the parties that civil
commitment cannot be used to punish.' 94 "If the object or pur-
186 Id. at 752.
117 Id. at 752; see also supra Part II.B.4.
88 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
189 Id. at 752-753.
190 Allen, 478 U.S. at 364.
191 Id. at 752. (citation omitted).
192 Id. at 753 (holding that "there is no dispute, as to Young, the Statute is
retroactive and disadvantageous").
193 Id. at 754.
'94 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-373.
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pose of the Kansas law had been to provide treatment but the
treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there
would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to
punish."' 95 This is exactly the problem Washington has as it
struggles to prove that the SCC is providing constitutionally
adequate mental health treatment. 
196
In his dissenting opinion in Young, Justice Stevens asserted that
it was the lack of adequate mental health treatment that should
allow detainees of the SCC to challenge the statute "as-applied" to
themselves.' 97 He noted that the majority incorrectly assumed that
the statute at issue was civil in nature, not criminal. "If conditions
of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the
scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge
of the effects of the statute."'' 98 While supporters of Washington's
law disagree as to whether there are inherent weaknesses in
Washington's sexual offender program, the general consensus
seems to be that:
[o]n a practical level, a civil commitment law cannot be
both a civil and criminal law because they are two differ-
ent legal systems. . . . Nor does a law's status in one or
the other change depending on how effectively a program
is implemented. . . . [A judge should] decide that based on
the statute on its face, not as it's applied. 99
Another flaw in Young is the Court's failure to address the lack
of opportunity in Washington's SCC for cure and release into the
community, which directly violates the provisions of the Washing-
ton statute.20 0 This also contradicts prior reasoning found in
195 Id. at 371.
196 See James G. Wright, Center for Sex Offenders Still Flawed, Says.t dge,
SEATTLE P.I., Dec. 20, 2000, at B I. Judge Dwyer has continued to hold DSHS
in contempt of court for failing to provide adequate mental health treatment to
SCC residents. Id.
'9' See Young, 121 S. Ct. at 741 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'9' Id. at 742.
199 Id.
200 See WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.010-.09.092 (2000).
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Supreme Court decisions such as Jackson v. Indiana,20 ' as well
as district and circuit court decisions in Turay v. Seling,2 °2 and
Sharp v. Seling, °3 respectively.
In Turay, the district court specifically addressed the issue of
adequate treatment. In denying relief to the state from an injunction
imposed by him ordering the state to improve treatment conditions,
Judge Dwyer stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution requires state officials to
provide civilly committed persons ... with access to
mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportu-
nity to be cured or to improve the mental condition for
which they were confined. This rule applies to sex offend-
ers, and the 'lack of funds, staff or facilities cannot justify
the State's failure to provide [those confined] with that
treatment necessary for rehabilitation.' 2°
Judge Dwyer went on to note that those offenders civilly commit-
ted under the statute are not prisoners, and therefore "they are
entitled by law to 'more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
201 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
20 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. Prior to this proceeding, a group of
civilly-committed sex offenders brought an action against the SCC's superinten-
dent and clinical director, for alleged constitutional violations regarding their
conditions of confinement. An injunction was issued in 1994 that had required
the State to take all reasonable steps within their power to provide SCC residents
with constitutionally adequate mental health treatment. The court subsequently
held the State in contempt for failing to comply with the injunction and ordered
it to pay into the court's registry fifty dollars per day per resident until the
injunction's requirements were complete or substantially complete. In this case,
the State moved to dissolve the injunction and the residents of the SCC moved
for the imposition of sanctions. The court noted that the test for contempt was
whether defendants performed all reasonable steps within their power to insure
compliance with a court order. The court held that defendants' efforts justified
a modification of the contempt order but did not justify dropping the sanction or
dissolving the injunction since the goal of providing adequate mental health
treatment was still not completely cured. Id.
203 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999).
204 Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
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designed to punish.' 20 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld this
reasoning in the appeal of Judge Dwyer's injunction.206 The court
held that Judge Dwyer properly found that the SCC had failed to
remedy several specific areas, including providing adequate mental
20health treatment. 07 In his decision, Judge Hawkins explained:
The appropriate legal standard for analyzing the constitu-
tionality of SCC's treatment program is set forth in
Ohlinger v. Watson. In Ohlinger, we held that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to
provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental
health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to
be cured and released.20 8
The Supreme Court has also supported this reasoning in
Jackson.20 9 The Court addressed the question of whether an
incompetent person could be committed pre-trial, in order to make
him competent for trial, if no effective treatment existed to
accomplish this goal. The Court held that the accused's commit-
ment violated the Due Process Clause because there was a
substantial probability that no available treatment would ever make
him competent to stand trial.210
Jackson was a twenty-seven-year-old, mentally retarded deaf-
mute, with the mental capacity of a pre-school child. He could not
read or write, nor could he communicate in any effective manner,
except through a very limited level of sign language.2 ' As
required by the Indiana statute,2t 2 Jackson was examined by two
psychiatrists, both of whom found that it was "extremely unlikely
that [he] could ever learn to read or write . . . [or] even had the
ability to develop any proficiency in sign language," and that
205 Id. (citation omitted).
206 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 166.
207 Id.
208 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172 (citing Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775,778
(9th Cir. 1980)).
209 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
210 Id. at 738.
211 Id. at 717.
212 IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971).
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"Indiana had no facilities that could help someone as badly off as
Jackson to learn minimal communication skills." '213 The Supreme
Court used this evidence, in part, to determine that Jackson's
commitment was therefore in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.214 It explained that because there is little likelihood that
Jackson will ever improve, "his commitment 'until sane' is not
really an indeterminate one," and, therefore, "is permanent in
practical effect."'
' 15
The failure by the Young Court to address the effect of
permanent confinement due to inadequate mental health treatment
highlights the flaw in reasoning that continues to manifest from
Hendricks, again providing a break in logic, and illustrating that
these statutes are punitive and not civil in nature.
C. Turay v. Weston
Although numerous cases have been brought challenging the
constitutionality of Washington's statute, none were as successful
as Turay.216 As a result of Turay's action in 1994, United States
District Judge William Dwyer, issued a remedial injunction, finding
that some conditions at the SCC were unconstitutional, and
ordering the state to remedy the situation or find some other means
than civil commitment to treat sex offenders.1 7 In the injunction,
Judge Dwyer ordered the State Department of Social and Health
Services ("DSHS"), which oversees the administration of the SCC,
to find alternative methods of treating those committed.218 In
addition, Judge Dwyer ordered the state to pay large fines if full
compliance with the statute had not been met by May 5, 2000.219
213 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 719.
214 Id. at 730.
215 Id. at 726-27.
216 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
217 Turay v. Weston, No. C91-664WD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (W.D. Wash.
June 3, 1994). In particular, the Court determined that the SCC had failed to
provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment, and issued an
injunction which required the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS)
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The fines would begin to accrue on May 8, 2000.220 A subse-
quent ruling modified this order, citing the fact that DSHS has
made substantial progress toward full compliance, and thus, the
compliance date was extended until December 5, 2000.221
On December 20, 2000, Judge Dwyer delivered another blow
to DSHS when he declined to lift his six-year injunction.222
While DSHS would have preferred to have satisfied its obligations
under the earlier court order, and have the injunction lifted
completely, it at least does not need to pay its fines up front.
Although the fines currently total in excess of one million dollars,
220 Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 2000). In his
May 5, 2000 order, Judge Dwyer imposed
[a] sanction amount of $50 per day per resident confined at the SCC
on that day will accrue for each day commencing May 8, 2000.
Beginning on June 15, 2000, and on the fifteenth of each month
thereafter until the sanction is removed, the defendants will serve and
file an accounting for the preceding month showing the names of the
SCC residents, the number of days each was confined during the
month, and the sanction amount accrued. The accrued total will be
canceled, or ordered paid to the residents or into the registry of the
court for their benefit, depending on whether the defendants have
completed or substantially completed their compliance with the
injunction at or before the time of the next hearing.
Id.; see also In re Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d 341, 345 (1999).
22 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. In an effort to bring the SCC into
compliance with the injunction, and to build a model civil commitment program,
DSHS began taking several steps:
Ongoing management consultation was provided in order to develop an
extensive 'Injunction Response Report,' a comprehensive and well-
organized presentation of the program's goals, objectives, action plans,
and achievements[; s]ubstantial resources were made available to
expand SCC's management team, increase clinical and residential
staffing, improve the facility and conditions, and provide the Superin-
tendent and Clinical Director with the expertise and personnel needed
to accomplish the program improvements required by the Court[; and
c]onsultants and new staff were brought in to address specific program
needs such as training, treatment planning, adaptation of the curriculum
for individuals with special needs, policy review, and development of
a strategic plan for SCC.
Id. at 1154.
222 Wright, supra note 196, at B1.
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Judge Dwyer ruled that the state has earned a reprieve, because the
state "has made a genuine and sustained effort to comply with the
injunction." '223
Despite improved conditions at the SCC, Judge Dwyer
recognized that many aspects of the SCC still fail to meet constitu-
tional standards, namely whether the SCC is offering adequate
mental health treatment.224 Judge Dwyer stated that "[m]ental
health treatment, if it is to be anything more than a sham, must
give the confined person the hope that if he gets well enough to be
safely released, he will be transferred to some less restrictive
alternative., 225 Unfortunately, Washington currently offers none
of these alternatives. 226 Although its statute includes provisions
for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative, there is no
less restrictive alternative available to move rehabilitated offenders,
rendering this provision of the statute moot at this time.227
Young is not the only sex offender who has been successful at
attacking the constitutionality of the Washington statute with an
"as-applied" analysis. In In re Detention of Campbell,228 Camp-
bell made a similar argument. Campbell asserted that because there
were certain conditions at the SCC that were unconstitutional,
namely there being no access to effective treatment, the Washing-
ton State statute should be deemed unconstitutional as well, and
that he should be released as a result.229 While the court agreed
with Campbell that some conditions were, in fact, unconstitutional,
223 Wright, supra note 196, at B1.
224 Wright, supra note 196, at B1.
225 Wright, supra note 196, at B 1.
226 Eli Sanders & Mike Carter, Community Revolts Over State Plan for
Rapist, SEATTLE TIMES, July 18, 2000, at B 1. "The DSHS has been desperately
but quietly trying to find a residential transition site for inmates graduating from
the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on McNeil Island." Id.
227 Sanders & Carter, supra note 226, at Bi. U.S. District Judge William
Dwyer has been holding the State in contempt of court for not providing SCC
residents with constitutional treatment, including the chance to ever get out.
228 986 P.2d 771 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1999).
229 Id. Campbell cited to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington's decision in Turay, in which Judge Dwyer determined that some of
the SCC confinement conditions did not meet constitutional requirements. Id. at
773.
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it did not agree that he should be released as a result. 3° In fact,
the court determined that the statute was still constitutional on its
face, and therefore, the remedial actions already in effect under
Judge Dwyer's order provided satisfactory relief for Campbell.23'
In his dissent, Judge Richard Sanders found this to be a bizarre
result.232 He noted that the court has failed to acknowledge the
following: "(1) a facially valid statute may nevertheless be
unconstitutionally applied and (2) where unconstitutional conditions
of confinement render the confinement itself unconstitutional, and
there is no alternative constitutional confinement, the habeas corpus
remedy is release." '233 This is further supported, he wrote, by the
fact that "both Hendricks and Young considered only a facial
challenge to the statute, expressly reserving an as-applied chal-
lenge. ' '234 Additionally, Judge Sanders noted that Allen supported
Campbell's arguments because, like Allen, Campbell proved that
his confinement was punitive in nature, thereby violating his
constitutional rights. 235 This proof, according to Judge Sanders,
was the fact that residents who want and receive treatment are
housed with those residents who choose not to receive treatment,
which is contradictory to therapeutic goals. 36 Furthermore,
"[t]here are no state certified sexual offender treatment providers
on the SCC staff . . .[and] [n]o treatment manual exists. '237 In
her concurring dissent, Judge Barbara A. Madsen agreed that
"[s]uch conditions cannot be the 'adequate care' to which [Camp-
230 Id. at 781. In an en banc opinion, Judge Charles W. Johnson wrote that
because Campbell failed to provide support for "his profusion of claims" he
would not be released. Id.
231 Id. at 775. The Court then determined that "the question is not simply
whether the conditions of confinement are constitutionally inadequate in certain
respects, but whether these constitutional infirmities transform Campbell's civil
detention into 'punishment,' thereby rendering the statute 'criminal' as applied."
Id.
232 Id. at 781.
233 id.
234 Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
235 Id. at 783.




bell] is statutorily entitled." '238
In a recent action brought by the state of Washington,239 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to defer to the profes-
sional judgments of the SCC superintendent and clinical director,
in determining whether its treatment program is effective.24 °
Washington asserted that "courts should show deference to the
judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 241' The majority
rejected this request, stating that the "SCC still does not provide
the type of treatment program that is constitutionally required for
civilly-committed persons - one that gives residents a realistic
opportunity to be cured or improve the mental condition for which
they were confined. 2 42 Similarly, in Turay,243 the court noted
that the state "[has] not brought family members sufficiently into
the treatment process, and some family members have never been
contacted by SCC or informed of opportunities for family counsel-
ing. [DSHS] must take all reasonable steps to provide this univer-
sally-recognized element of treatment." 2' This was upheld on
appeal by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in November
2000.245
In his most recent appeal,246 Young again argued that because
his confinement was indefinite, due to a lack of quality treatment
to help him get better, the Washington statute imposed a punitive
measure, making the statute criminal and not civil in nature.247
The Court, however, quickly dismissed his claims. In his majority
opinion, Judge Pregerson noted that Hendricks "foreclose[d] the
claim that the Washington statute, on its face," was punitive.248
238 Id. at 790.
239 Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
240 Id. at 1171.
241 id.
242 Id. at 1172.
243 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
244 Id. at 1156.
245 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1174.
246 Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999).
247 Id. at 873.
248 Id. at 874. Judge Pregerson said "[i]n Hendricks, the Supreme Court held
that, because involuntary confinement pursuant to Kansas's civil commitment
statute is not punitive, that statute's operation does not raise ex post facto or
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Despite valid arguments such as those raised by Young, Turay
and Campbell, the Supreme Court has again chosen to affirm its
opinion in Hendricks. Such a decision is less costly, and it does
satisfy public opinion. Moreover, the Young decision has provided
additional support for the Court's former assertion that:
[w]here the State has 'disavowed any punitive intent';
limited confinement to a small segment of particularly
dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safe-
guards; directed that confined persons be segregated from
the general prison population and afforded the same status
as others who have been civilly committed; recommended
treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate
release upon a showing that the individual is no longer
dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it
acted with punitive intent ... [and] thus removes an
essential prerequisite for both ... double jeopardy and ex
post facto claims.249
III. THE FUTURE OF SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION
Each year since 1990, approximately twenty-five convicted sex
offenders set for release from prison are committed to the SCC
involuntarily, with little chance of ever leaving. In fact, only
double jeopardy concerns," and also reminded appellants that this held true for
Washington as well, since Kansas's statute was modeled on, and is substantially
similar to, Washington's. Id. at 873-874 (emphasis in original).
249 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
250 See Nancy Bartley, Jury to Decide Treatment for Predator, SEATrLE
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at BI. In February 2000, a Washington jury heard
testimony from Charles Skinner, who would have become the sixth person
treated outside the SCC, in his petition to be released after serving ten years in
prison for several rape and attempted rape convictions. Id. Part of the trouble
with releasing him is finding an appropriate treatment facility in the community.
Planned Facility for Sex Offenders Dropped, SEATTLE TIMES, July 28, 2000, at
B3 [hereinafter Planned Facility]. The state has hit many obstacles in communi-
ties who work together to outbid the state and buy property intended to become
sites for halfway houses to treat sex offenders. The state now faces the further
problem that there no alternatives for those to whom it grants release from the
SCC. One hundred and seven sex offenders remain at the SCC. Sanders &
Carter, supra note 226, at B 1.
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five SCC residents have been released through court action,"'
while two have undergone successful treatment and are expected to
be released sometime in the near future.25 2 Despite this low
number of release, it seems inevitable that sex offender legislation
will remain unchanged, especially since the Supreme Court has
deemed the statutory schemes to be constitutional. Now, the only
obstacle facing states such as Washington is providing the proper
means to be able to enforce its statutory provisions. This may be
accomplished through the state relief cited by the Supreme Court
in Young, or it may come through the enactment of alternative
provisions in the statutory scheme. Whichever way it occurs, it is
not likely that states will be compelled to abandon civil commit-
ment, regardless of any finding of unconstitutional application.
With the Supreme Court holding that the proper relief to be
given to challengers should be sought through court orders such as
that currently in force in Washington State,253 nonlegal problems
may prevent the states from ever being able to comply with such
injunctive relief. For example, despite the recent improvements in
staffing and programming, the state continues to struggle with
overwhelming financial issues:
(1) the SCC must be removed from a prison environment
251 Thomas Shapley, Predator Goes Home on a Short Leash: Tight Rules
May Be Model for Reducing Risks, SEATTLE P.I., May 14, 1999, at C1. Since
1996, only five inmates have been release from the SCC, all under strict
conditions. The first inmate to be released was Dennis Peterson, who was
released to a residence in Arlington, WA. Kane Gillespie was released to a group
home in South Carolina. Steven Twining was released to the same residence in
Arlington, WA as Peterson. Joseph Aqui was released to his family, as was
Donald Hendrickson. Id.
252 Sanders & Carter, supra note 226, at B 1.
253 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 736 (holding that "if the Center fails to fulfill its
statutory duty, those confined may have a state law cause of action"); see also
Sharp v. Seling, 233 F.3d 1166 (2000). In 1994, Judge Dwyer ordered DSHS to
provide adequate treatment to sex offenders as constitutionally required. Mike
Carter, Crucial Hearing Today for Sex-Predator Center, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
18, 2000, at B3. The court gave the state until May of 2000 to come into
substantial compliance with the order or face fines of nearly $38,000 a week. In
May this deadline was extended until December 2000, and in December it was
extended again. Mike Carter, Sex-Offender Center Receives Reprieve from Fines,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 6, 2000, at A14.
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and relocated to a more treatment-oriented facility;254
(2) legal costs continue to skyrocket as the state defends
and settles lawsuits brought by residents, with the bulk of
this burden felt by the State's taxpayers;255
(3) the SCC is subject to a substantial staff turnover, and
is facing difficulty replacing its nationally-renowned
clinical director;
256
(4) despite receiving the money to build a facility separate
from the McNeil Island prison, (Governor Gary Locke has
appropriated $14 million to build this257) there does not
seem to be anywhere to place it.
2158
Any possible solutions to these problems will be costly.259 More-
over, the State already pays hundreds of thousands of dollars per
year to support the current residents of the SCC, and that may not
be enough to cover costs in a new facility.260
Washington may benefit from the experiences of other states.
Kansas, Minnesota and Arizona, among others, managed to start
and run commitment programs without all the legal troubles that
plague Washington, because those states have programs that
254 See Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
255 See Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
256 See Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
257 See Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
258 See Planned Facility, supra note 245, at B3. Faced with overwhelming
opposition from neighbors and residents, the state has been forced to abandoned
plans for halfway homes and treatment centers in Thurston County, Lacey and
Indian Ridge Youth Camp near Arlington. Sanders & Carter, supra note 226, at
B 1. In some cases, developers have joined with residents to buy out the land the
State buys for many times its value in order to prevent these new facilities.
Diane Brooks, Indian Ridge Won't Get Sex Felons; Distance Rules Out Site as
Halfway House, SEATrLE TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at B 1.
259 Carter, supra note 148, at Al. The cost to Washington State taxpayers to
build a new facility will be approximately $81 million, and just holding the sex
offenders in a special facility costs nearly triple that of a prison inmate at
$130,000 a year versus $25,000 for the inmate. Additionally, with new residents
entering each year and very few leaving, a new center would require an
operating budget of more than $72 million per year. Carter, supra note 148, at
Al.
260 Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
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demonstrate a serious effort toward treatment.26'
Arizona, for instance, utilizes a secure commitment center, but
before a sex offender is committed, the state must consider less
restrictive alternatives such as home confinement, electronic
monitoring or release into a halfway house.262 Minnesota also
runs a center, but there is not the same "indefinite" commitment as
has been effectuated in Washington. There, residents are allowed
to earn privileges such as supervised community release as they
advance through treatment.263 Texas has passed a civil-commit-
ment law, as well, but it does not utilize a secure facility.21
Instead, it releases offenders back into the community with specific
orders for treatment. If any of these orders are violated, the
offenders are sent back to prison.265 States have also managed to
show a commitment to treatment simply by placing the facility
261 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-710(A) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 241.67(b)
(2000); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.081 (2000).
262 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-3710(A) (2001). "If the court determines that
conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the
person and will adequately protect the community and the court determines that
the minimum conditions under section 36-3711 are met, the court shall enter
judgment and order the person's conditional release to a less restrictive
alternative." Id.
263 MINN. STAT. § 241.67(b). "The commissioner shall provide for residential
and outpatient sex offender programming and aftercare when required for
conditional release." Id.
264 See Mark Babineck, Civil Commitment Yet to Be Used; No Sex Offenders
Sent to Treatment Because Legal Wrangling Delayed Trials, DAL. MORN. NEWS,
July 24, 2000, at 21A. Under Texas' 1999 Civil Commitment Act, a judge or
jury can order violent sexual offenders to go to outpatient counseling or to be
placed under full-time electronic surveillance after their prison terms have ended.
Id.
265 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.081.
If at a trial conducted under Subchapter D the judge or jury determines
that the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall commit
the person for outpatient treatment and supervision to be coordinated
by the case manager. The outpatient treatment and supervision must
begin on the person's release from a secure correctional facility or
discharge from a state hospital and must continue until the person's
behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that the person is no
longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.
923
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
outside the prison setting."'
Building a new facility for the placement of the SCC could
begin to solve some of the remaining issues necessary to fix before
the injunction is lifted. At the least, it would move residents away
from a prison-like environment, and provide a more treatment-
oriented site. In fact, in an effort to persuade Judge Dwyer to lift
the injunction, the state had proposed to convert a prison work
camp on McNeil Island into a replacement for the SCC, 67
because Dwyer had previously ruled that a new facility apart from
the McNeil Islands Corrections Center is a necessary step in
conforming with constitutional standards. 26' Additionally, in
compliance with its earlier Court order, DSHS has presented plans
to create a site for its first halfway house in Walla Walla,
Washington.2 69 The house had been scheduled to open in March,
but residents of Walla Walla have put up resistance, and have
threatened to sue the state for failing to comply with local regula-
270tions. In addition to the basic problem of finding a site for the
new facility, however budget problems may prevent the facility
from ever being built. According to projections by DSHS, the new
commitment center would be completed in 2005, but full to
capacity by 2013.271 At today's cost per resident, the State would
require more than $72 million per year to operate the facility, not
266 See, e.g., Minnesota, which requires its secure facility to be located at a
separate cite in Moose Lake. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (2000).
267 Associated Press, Proposal: Convert McNeil Camp Into Sex-Offender
Facility, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000 [hereinafter Proposal].
268 Id.; see also Sharp, 233 F.3d. at 1166.
269 See Katherine Long, Sex Offender Ruling Cites State; Judge Notes
Progress Made by DSHS, but Calls for More Improvement in Program, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000 at BI; Wright, supra note 196, at BI.
270 Proposal, supra note 267. The Walla Walla City Council has voted to sue
DSHS, contending that "the agency failed to follow public processes in choosing
the site. The council also approved a moratorium and interim zoning ordinance
to temporarily block the agency's application for a building permit." Proposal,
supra note 267. Walla Walla specifically cited the fact that DSHS failed to hold
public hearings with residents prior to proposing the city as a possible site. Sarah
Duran, Sex Center Fines Left Intact; Judge: State Has Improved Conditions at
Center, But More Progress Is Needed, NEWS TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2000, at B 1.
271 Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
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including the legal costs involved in defending the commit-
ments.272
New criminal laws may provide additional solutions to
confinement challenges. In 1998, Washington passed a "two-strikes
law' 273 that mandates life sentences for twice-convicted sex
offenders.274 In 2000, the State legislature attempted to pass a law
that would allow longer sentences for first-time sex offenders,275
but the Bill did not pass. 6 Washington has only just begun to
consider the less restrictive alternatives utilized by other states.277
Producing the means for SCC residents to be released into a less
restrictive alternative, such as tweny-four-hour monitoring in a
halfway house, may provide another necessary step to lift the
current injunction on the SCC.27 8
The Washington law already provides that residents who are
civilly committed are entitled to a yearly review of their treatment
progress, 279 and if the resident has sufficiently advanced in
response, then the court may order a transfer to a less restrictive
alternative. 28 Currently DSHS is planning for this less restrictive
272 Carter, supra note 148, at Al. "Eric Janus, a professor of mental-health
law in St. Paul, Minn., predicts that 'the money will get so big that, eventually,
states will simply stop doing it."' Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
- 273 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(A) (2000). Codified as the Persistent
Offender Accountability Act (POAA).
274 Id. "The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range
for that offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are
substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." Id.
275 Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
276 Carter, supra note 148, at Al.
277 See Brooks, supra note 258, at B 1; Planned Facility, supra note 250, at
B3; Sanders & Carter, supra note 220, at BI.
278 Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. In his May 2000 review, Judge Dwyer
ordered that "arrangements must be made for the community transition of
qualified residents, under supervision, when they are ready for a less restrictive
alternative ... [or] the constitutional requirement of treatment leading, if
successful, to cure and release cannot fully be met." Id.
279 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070 (West 2000). "Each person
committed under this chapter shall have a current examination of his or her
mental condition made at least once every year." Id.
280 Id. "The annual report shall include consideration of whether conditional
release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the person and will
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alternative in order to prove it is meeting the treatment necessary
for the law to remain constitutional.2 8' There are three basic steps
that DSHS predicts residents who qualify for a less restrictive
alternative of treatment will follow in the future:
When a court orders a less restrictive alternative, a resident
would move from the Commitment Center on McNeil
Island to a Secure Residential Treatment Facility .... The
next step in the treatment path would be for a resident to
transition to Secure Community Housing with no more
than three residents - each of them subject to 24-hour-a-
day, line-of-sight supervision. The final step in the treat-
ment path would be a transition to private housing. 82
Perhaps following Iowa's example would aid Washington in
creating a more effective treatment program. Iowa is one of fifteen
states with laws modeled after Washington State's that could have
been affected by the Supreme Court decision in Young.283 Yet,
Iowa is not yet experiencing challenges to the treatment aspect of
its statute. 84 In fact, according to Iowa Attorney General Tom
Miller, "[t]he treatment program that is offered is intense and
diverse, and the high staff-to-patient ratio increases the likelihood
of success., 285 Most of this self-proclaimed success is attributed
to the fact that Iowa has a high compliance rate, with all of the
offenders "involved and making progress. 286 The Iowa program
was passed in 1998 and is modeled after the Kansas statute (which
adequately protect the community." Id.
"81 Proposal, supra note 267. DSHS has already presented Judge Dwyer with
a preliminary plan for the conversion of a prison work camp into a new facility
that would help bring the SCC's treatment program up to constitutional
standards. Proposal, supra note 267.
282 DSHS Proposes Siting Criteria and Public Involvement for Placing
Former Sex Offenders in Secure Residential Treatment when Courts Rule Them
Eligible, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 1, 2000, at 2.
283 See Sam Skolnik, State's Predator Law on Trial; High Court Will Hear
Arguments that Confining Offenders After Prison Release Is Double Jeopardy,
SEATTLE P.I., Oct. 31, 2000, at B1.
284 See Petroski, supra note 99, at 1.
285 See Petroski, supra note 99, at 1.
286 See Petroski, supra note 99, at 1.
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was directly modeled after Washington's). 2 87 However Washing-
ton chooses to cope with the injunction ordered upon it, there are
many states whose programs provide viable models that comport
with the Young decision, which appears to have changed the face
of traditional civil commitment.
CONCLUSION
This Note examined the challenges that Washington will need
to overcome with its violent sexual predator statute, namely that it
continues to violate constitutional standards until adequate mental
health treatment can be provided to SCC residents. In response, this
Note supported existing alternatives, concluding that by building a
new mental health facility geographically separated from the SCC's
current location at the McNeil Island Correctional Facility,
Washington can begin to establish a constitutionally adequate
mental health treatment program for SCC residents.
This Note also raised the question of whether Washington can
ever satisfy constitutional treatment standards, if no known sex
offender treatment exists. This does not appear to be an issue as far
as the Supreme Court is concerned, as reflected in the Young
decision.288 The SCC, however, will continue to operate under a
court-ordered injunction, as long as treatment issues remain
unaddressed. 289 At some point, this could mean that Washington
will need to pay million of dollars in fines to SCC residents, if it
cannot offer adequate treatment to them.
It is clear that, although statutes that provide for the civil
commitment of sex offenders have overcome the constitutional
287 IOWA CODE § 229A (1999). This statute was passed based on legislative
findings which determined that civil commitment is intended to "provide short-
term treatment to persons with serious mental disorders and then return them to
the community." IC § 229A.1 (1999).
288 Young, 121 S. Ct. at 737. Citing its decision in Hendricks, the Supreme
Court recognized in its recent Young holding that "not all mental conditions [are]
treatable. For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however, [the Court]
explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to their civil confinement,
because the State had an interest in protecting the public from dangerous
individuals with treatable as well as untreatable conditions." Id.
289 Wright, supra note 196, at B1.
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challenges raised for consideration in the Supreme Court, state
courts now have the burden of looking beyond those decisions and
must formulate more stringent tests. 290 They must be the arbiters
of punishment for the crimes committed with the protection of
constitutional rights. Only when the state courts begin to consider
the policies behind the criminal justice system and the ramifications
of a system of involuntary commitments they have condoned, will
the courts be able to return to the original intention of treatment by
civil commitment, and abandon its use as indefinite punishment.
290 See, e.g., Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1166.
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